A practitioner's guide to e-commerce FDD: GMV vs net revenue, take rate, CAC/LTV and payback, returns, cohort retention, gift-card deferred revenue and fulfilment cost.
E-commerce sellers pitch themselves in a language of their own: GMV, take rate, CAC, LTV, blended ROAS, contribution margin two. Founders quote these with confidence, decks are built around them, and every one of them can be defined in a way that flatters the business. The FDD analyst's job is to translate that vocabulary back into accounting reality - to find the revenue the company actually keeps, the profit that survives returns and fulfilment, and the customer economics that hold up once you separate the paid-for growth from the organic base. This is a metrics-heavy sector, and the metrics are only as honest as their definitions. Here is how to read them.
The most common sleight of hand in e-commerce diligence is quoting Gross Merchandise Value (GMV) as if it were revenue. GMV is the total value of goods transacted across the platform. For a marketplace that connects third-party sellers with buyers, revenue is only the commission - GMV might be £100m while revenue is £12m. For an owned-inventory retailer that buys stock and sells it, GMV and gross revenue are much closer, but even then GMV usually excludes returns, cancellations and discounts.
Your first task is to lock down the revenue definition and reconcile it to the audited accounts:
Always build your model on net revenue, and always know which model you are looking at, because owned-inventory and marketplace businesses have completely different margin structures, working capital profiles and risk. Confusing the two is the fastest way to misprice the deal, and it is a distinction that runs right through the underlying revenue quality work.
In many categories - fashion especially - a large share of what ships comes back. Return rates of 20–40% are normal in apparel. Returns hit the business three ways at once: they reverse revenue, they destroy margin (return shipping, inspection, repackaging, markdown or write-off of returned stock), and they distort every ratio built on gross sales.
Ask one question and watch the founder's face: "Is your headline revenue before or after returns?" If the answer is "before", the entire deck needs re-basing - and so does the multiple. In high-return categories, the gap between gross and net revenue is not a rounding item; it is the difference between two different businesses.
The business model determines almost everything else, so establish it early.
| Dimension | Owned-inventory retailer | Marketplace / platform |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue recognised | Full sale price of goods | Commission / take rate only |
| Gross margin | Product margin (often 30–55%) | Very high (mostly fee income) |
| Inventory risk | On balance sheet - obsolescence, markdowns | None (third-party sellers hold stock) |
| Working capital | Heavy - funds stock ahead of sale | Light, often negative (holds buyer cash) |
| Key risks | Overstock, shelf-life, buying accuracy | Seller churn, take-rate pressure, disintermediation |
A hybrid that does both - its own products plus a third-party marketplace - must be split, because a blended gross margin is meaningless. The single most important structural question in e-commerce FDD is: who owns the inventory risk? It drives the working capital investment, which feeds straight into the net working capital analysis and the peg.
This is the heart of an e-commerce QoE. The question behind every acquisition-driven online business is simple: does a customer generate more contribution margin over their life than it cost to acquire them, and how fast? The metrics that answer it are CAC, LTV and payback period, and each is routinely gamed.
A rigorous read here is really an exercise in unit economics - the same discipline you would apply to any subscription or consumer business.
The table below tests a direct-to-consumer brand claiming strong unit economics. Watch what happens when LTV is rebuilt on contribution margin instead of revenue, and CAC on new customers only.
| Metric | As pitched | Adjusted (analyst) | Why it changed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Average order value | £70 | £70 | - |
| Orders per customer (lifetime) | 4.0 | 3.2 | Return-adjusted, realistic cohort |
| Gross revenue per customer | £280 | £224 | Fewer real orders |
| Less returns (25%) | - | (£56) | Not netted in pitch |
| Net revenue per customer | £280 | £168 | Post-returns |
| Contribution margin % | 45% | 38% | Includes fulfilment & payment fees |
| LTV (contribution) | £126 | £64 | Margin, not revenue basis |
| CAC | £40 (all customers) | £62 (new only) | Blended spend excluded repeat buyers |
| LTV / CAC | 3.2x | 1.0x | Below the ~3x health threshold |
| Payback (months) | ~9 | ~23 | Contribution recovers CAC far slower |
The takeaway: a business pitched at a comfortable 3.2x LTV/CAC collapses to roughly 1.0x once returns are netted, LTV is put on a contribution basis and CAC counts only new customers. The company is buying revenue at close to break-even and calling it growth. Nothing here is fraud - it is definitional optimism, and unpicking it is precisely the value an FDD analyst adds.
Blended metrics lie; cohorts do not. Group customers by the period they first purchased and track their spend forward month by month. This reveals whether the business retains customers or simply refills a leaking bucket with paid acquisition.
Cohort analysis also lets you split revenue into acquired-this-period versus repeat, which is the online equivalent of separating recurring from non-recurring income. A business whose growth is almost entirely first-time buyers acquired at rising CAC is far more fragile than the headline growth rate suggests.
E-commerce carries a specific deferred-revenue item: gift cards and store credit. When a customer buys a £50 gift card, the retailer receives cash but has delivered nothing - it is a liability, not revenue, until redeemed. Two things to check:
Any subscription element (a "buy monthly" box, a loyalty membership fee) creates further deferred revenue that must be recognised over the service period, exactly as in the broader deferred revenue treatment. Prepaid subscriptions also flatter working capital - the customer funds the business in advance - so treat that cash carefully when building net debt.
The reported gross margin of an online retailer is almost never the economic one, because a large chunk of the cost of serving a customer sits below the gross-profit line or gets buried in operating costs. To get to a true contribution margin, you must load in:
| Per-order economics | £ |
|---|---|
| Net revenue (after returns & discounts) | 56.00 |
| Cost of goods | (28.00) |
| Reported gross profit | 28.00 |
| Fulfilment & warehousing | (6.50) |
| Outbound shipping (subsidised) | (4.80) |
| Returns processing (allocated) | (3.20) |
| Payment fees (~2.5%) | (1.75) |
| Contribution margin | 11.75 |
A "50% gross margin" business is really earning ~21% contribution per order here - and it is that contribution, not the gross margin, that funds marketing and overhead. Presenting the buyer with a proper contribution bridge is one of the most valuable things an e-commerce QoE delivers, and it belongs in the EBITDA adjustments analysis when shipping subsidies or fulfilment costs are misclassified.
E-commerce is a favourite because it rewards commercial fluency. A typical prompt: "A DTC brand is growing revenue 60% a year and the founder says unit economics are strong. What do you look at?"
"Growth of 60% tells me nothing until I know how it's funded, so I'd go straight to unit economics on a cohort basis. First I'd fix the definitions: net revenue after returns and discounts, not GMV, and new-customer CAC using paid marketing spend only rather than blended across repeat buyers. Then I'd rebuild LTV on contribution margin - loading in fulfilment, shipping, returns processing and payment fees - not on revenue, and test the LTV-to-CAC ratio and the payback period. Anything under about 3x with payback beyond 18 months makes me nervous. The clincher is the cohort retention curve: if older cohorts flatten out and keep spending, there's a real repeat base and the growth is durable; if every cohort decays to zero, the 60% is bought with marketing and it stops the moment spend stops. I'd also check the returns provision, gift-card deferred revenue and whether prepaid subscriptions are flattering working capital. My output would be an adjusted contribution margin, honest unit economics and a clear split between organic repeat revenue and paid-acquired revenue - because those deserve very different multiples."
The strength of that answer is that it refuses the founder's framing and rebuilds the metrics from accounting first. If you want to drill answers like this until they are automatic, the TS interview preparation plan is designed for it.
E-commerce diligence is a translation exercise. The founder speaks in GMV, blended CAC and revenue-based LTV; the buyer needs net revenue, new-customer CAC and contribution-margin LTV, tested against a cohort curve that shows whether customers stay. Do the translation honestly and one of two things happens: you confirm a business with a real repeat engine and defensible economics, or you reveal that the growth was rented from an ad platform and stops the day the budget does. Online, the metrics are a story the company tells about itself - your job is to check whether the customers agree.
The Transaction Services Interview Programme (€119.99, one-time) includes a full e-commerce unit-economics module covering GMV-to-net-revenue reconciliation, cohort-based LTV/CAC, contribution bridges and gift-card deferred revenue, with modelling drills and interview cases. Enrol today.
Hundreds of candidates prepared their interviews with this programme. Those who landed the role have one thing in common: they worked the cases before walking into the room.